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FROM MORAL AGENCY TO COLLECTIVE 
WRONGS:  
RE-THINKING COLLECTIVE MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Marion Smiley* 
How is collective moral responsibility possible? This is the 
major question now being asked about collective responsibility in 
philosophical circles. But the question is rarely posed in such 
general terms. Instead, it is posed as a question about the ability of 
groups to intend and to act. How, philosophers ask, can groups be 
understood to intend and to act in contexts where they are being 
held morally responsible for harm? I argue below that this 
question—and the assumptions that ground it—are misguided and 
that if we really want to know whether collective moral 
responsibility is possible we will have to shift our attention away 
from the ability of groups to intend and to act and focus on their 
ability to produce bad things and be blamed for them. In other 
words, we will have to rethink collective moral responsibility 
itself. 
I begin in Part One by agreeing with critics that groups are not 
able to act and to intend in the sense required by the prevailing 
notion of moral responsibility. I suggest in Part Two that, contrary 
to critics, collective moral responsibility is not defeated by the 
inability of groups to intend and to act, since the ability to act and 
to intend is not a condition of moral responsibility per se. Instead, 
it is a condition of one particular—distinctly Kantian—notion of 
moral responsibility. In Part Three, I sketch the contours of an 
alternative notion of collective moral responsibility and suggest 
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that it is both morally acceptable and appropriate to groups such as 
corporations, clubs, and nation states. 
I. COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE QUESTION OF 
INTENTIONS  
Collective moral responsibility is the moral responsibility of 
collectives, rather than individuals, for harm. Hence, it has groups 
themselves, rather than group members, as its moral agents, and 
cannot—qua collective moral responsibility—be distributed to 
group members in the guise of individual moral responsibility. Nor 
can it be divided up among them. Instead, it has to remain attached 
to the groups themselves—whether these groups are mobs, clubs, 
corporations, or nations—and understood as the result of 
something harmful that these groups have themselves done or 
failed to do qua groups.1 
Since collective moral responsibility has groups, rather than 
group members, as its moral agents, it might be thought to be 
different in kind from individual moral responsibility and to have a 
structure, meaning, and set of requirements of its own. But, in the 
works of contemporary philosophers who write about collective 
moral responsibility, it does not. (I discuss several important 
exceptions in Part Three.) Instead, it has the same meaning, 
structure, and requirements as its individualistic counterpart. 
                                                          
1 I do not mean to suggest here that collective responsibility is totally 
independent of the actions of group members. For, it is not. In some cases, we 
ascribe collective responsibility to groups partly, although never wholly, on the 
basis of what we understand to be the contributions of particular individuals. In 
other cases, we use our ascriptions of collective responsibility as a starting point 
for thinking about whether particular individuals are responsible for harm. 
Moreover, we are often justified in doing so. But we cannot—even in cases such 
as these where individual and collective responsibility come together—equate 
the two or understand collective responsibility as a matter of mere shared 
individual responsibility. Instead, we have to acknowledge that collective 
responsibility is the responsibility of undifferentiated wholes. I explore the 
relationship between individual and collective responsibility, as well as other 
aspects of collective responsibility, in Marion Smiley, Collective Responsibility, 
in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2010 ed.), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/collective-
responsibility. 
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Indeed, it is the same notion of moral responsibility. What is this 
notion? 
While those now writing about collective moral responsibility 
rarely explore the notion of moral responsibility that they employ, 
they do make clear that moral responsibility is from their 
perspective not just a matter of causal responsibility. Instead, it is a 
matter of both causal responsibility and moral blameworthiness 
together. Likewise, they make clear that while moral responsibility 
understood as such may ground social and legal responsibility, it is 
not something that we ascribe to agents after they have acted on 
the basis of our own criteria of blameworthiness. Instead, it is a 
moral fact about agents: namely, that they caused something bad 
and are morally blameworthy.2 
How can we think about moral responsibility as a matter of 
causal responsibility and blameworthiness together? How can we 
think about it as a moral fact about agents themselves independent 
of worldly practice? I address these questions much more fully 
elsewhere.3 Suffice it to point out here that what enables us to 
think about moral responsibility in this way is a particular, 
distinctly Kantian, notion of blameworthiness that many of us 
might not feel comfortable defending in general but that we 
nevertheless frequently assume, often un-self-consciously, in our 
discussions of moral responsibility.4   
                                                          
2 The conflation of causation and moral blameworthiness here is accepted 
by almost all of those now writing about the moral responsibility of agents for 
external harm. John Harris is typical when he writes of moral responsibility: 
“[W]hen we say that someone was the cause of harm . . . (or at least as one of 
the authors), we are saying that he is responsible for it and . . . to blame.” John 
Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 192, 207 
(1974). 
3 See generally MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A 
PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW (1992) [hereinafter SMILEY, MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY]. 
4 The Kantian notion of moral responsibility is that which locates the 
source of moral blameworthiness in an agent’s own will—or willful causation of 
a bad act—and insists that such blameworthiness be understood as independent 
of worldly practices of blame. Kant developed this notion of moral 
responsibility primarily in, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
(H. J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785), as well as in, RELIGION WITHIN 
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Three things about this notion of blameworthiness are key in 
this context and distinguish it from other notions of moral 
blameworthiness. First, it is moral, rather than social or legal, 
blameworthiness and moral blameworthiness of a particular kind: 
namely, that associated with moral guilt and frequently referred to 
in the language of moral taint.5 Second, it is not relative to worldly 
considerations but rather a matter of deserving blame in some 
abstract—and ideal—sense. Third, it is wholly under an 
individual’s own control and has its source in moral agency itself, 
or, in other words, in the act of freely willing either one’s own bad 
action or harm in the world. 
These three features make it possible for us to think about 
moral responsibility as a moral fact about agents themselves rather 
than as something that we ascribe to agents as part of our worldly 
practices of blame. The first two enable us to imagine moral 
responsibility as untainted by the various contingencies—social, 
political, and practical—associated with practices of social and 
legal blame. The third allows us to think about moral responsibility 
as a matter of both causal responsibility and blameworthiness 
together, as well as to ensure that blameworthiness does not 
require further justification once moral agency for harm has been 
established.  
As it turns out, all three of these features are problematic. The 
first feature, the independence of blameworthiness from particular 
                                                          
THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson, trans., 
Harper & Row 1960) (1793), where he famously wrote that “[I]nnate . . .  guilt . 
. . is so denominated because it may be discovered in man as early as the first 
manifestation of the exercise of freedom . . . .” Id. at 33. I discuss the Kantian 
notion of moral responsibility extensively in, SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
supra note 3, at 72–101, and refer to several contemporary versions of it in Part 
II. 
5 The most common way of expressing this notion of moral 
blameworthiness is moral guilt of the kind associated with the value of an 
individual qua moral agent. Jonathan Glover captures the prevailing notion of 
moral blameworthiness when he writes of moral blameworthiness that it is a 
moral fact about the worth of persons: a “kind of moral accounting, where a 
person’s actions are recorded on an individual balance sheet, with the object of 
assessing his moral worth.” To say that an individual is morally blameworthy 
for some state of affairs is to say that “he is a bad person.” JONATHAN GLOVER, 
RESPONSIBILITY 64, 96 (Routledge & K. Paul, 1970). 
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practices of blame and actual blamers, is very difficult to 
substantiate. For, while blameworthiness may not require that we 
actually blame an agent, it does require for its very meaning that 
we make reference to a particular practice of blame; and once we 
make reference to a particular practice of blame, we have to 
acknowledge that while we can—and should—take into 
consideration what agents actually do to deserve blame, we cannot 
treat their blameworthiness as completely under their own control.6 
The other two features of moral blameworthiness are equally 
difficult to sustain. The second—total control by moral agents over 
themselves and their actions—requires a very strong notion of free 
will that may simply not exist if theories of determinism are true.7 
The third feature—the location of moral blameworthiness in the 
act of freely willing a bad action or harm in the world—i.e., in 
moral agency itself—becomes difficult to sustain once we 
acknowledge that an undetermined will may not only not be 
grounded in moral personality but be by nature a matter of 
randomness. How, J. J. C. Smart asked many years ago, can the 
absence of determinism be anything other than randomness?8 
Not surprisingly, the difficulties associated with the prevailing 
                                                          
6 The dependence of blameworthiness on a particular practice of 
blameworthiness is less obvious in religious contexts than it is in secular 
contexts, since in religious contexts we are able to posit an ideal blamer, namely, 
God, and to take for granted that his/her/its criteria of blameworthiness are in 
some sense ideal and perhaps even objective. But even in religious contexts, 
moral blameworthiness has to be understood as both part of a particular practice 
of blame and dependent on an actual blamer to be meaningful. Theologians do 
not have to worry about such dependence, since, unlike secular philosophers, 
they do not view moral responsibility as wholly under an agent’s control. 
7 The concern here is that if determinism is true, free will is not possible, 
since freedom of the will—or at least that which grounds moral responsibility as 
traditionally understood—requires that the agent in question have originated, not 
only her actions, but the will behind them. To do so is not possible if that will is 
determined for her by forces external to itself, whether these forces are 
biological or social. The likelihood that determinism is true has led many 
philosophers in the Western tradition to ask how free will might be rendered 
compatible with determinism. Kant himself answered this question in 
GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS by creating a realm of pure 
rationality in which moral agents are able to transcend determinism. 
8 See generally J. J. C. Smart, Free-Will, Praise, and Blame, 70 MIND 291 
(1961). 
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notion of moral responsibility are exacerbated in cases where what 
an agent is being held morally responsible for are not just 
his/her/its own actions but external harm itself. For, an agent’s 
causal responsibility for external harm is relative to various social 
norms, expectations, and projects that have their source in social 
and political practice, rather than something he/she/it controls.9 
Hence, it would not appear to be the kind of thing in virtue of 
which an agent could be morally blameworthy. 
Since the prevailing notion of moral blameworthiness is so 
problematic, we might expect those who write about moral 
responsibility to explore these problems in depth or at least to 
acknowledge them. But they do not generally do so. Instead, they 
do two things to make things easier for themselves in contexts 
where they have to make explicit the conditions under which 
agents are morally responsible in practice. The first is simply to 
take the above notion of moral blameworthiness for granted as 
coherent. The second is to replace “free will” with “intentionality” 
in the articulation of these conditions.10 
What conditions must be present if individuals are going to be 
held morally responsible, not only for their own actions, but for 
external harm as well? First of all, the agent must have performed 
an action that was causally responsible for the harm—which, most 
                                                          
9 While most of those now writing about causal responsibility in the 
context of moral agency acknowledge the importance of these social norms, 
expectations, and projects to the causal responsibility of an agent’s action for 
harm, they do not agree on how these social norms, expectations, and projects 
are incorporated into our judgments of causal responsibility. For three very 
different perspectives here see generally John Casey, Actions and Consequences, 
in MORALITY AND MORAL REASONING: FIVE ESSAYS IN ETHICS, 155 (1971); 
John Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 192 
(1974); Dennis Thompson, Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The 
Problem of Many Hands, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905 (1980). 
10 Not surprisingly, such a substitution is very helpful here, since 
intentionality, unlike free will, can be discovered in the world, and since it is 
already associated with practices of blame—social and legal—with which we 
are familiar. But, as I argue in Volitional Excuses and the Primacy of Fairness 
(forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), the substitution of 
“free will” with “intentionality” is nevertheless questionable. For, the point of 
insisting on free will in the context of moral blameworthiness is that it is 
supposedly under an individual’s own control, and the process of formulating 
intentions may well be part of a determined psychological process. 
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of those now writing on the subject agree, is a matter of being a 
“primary cause” of it. Second, the agent must have freely willed or 
at least intended that action to the extent that we can say that 
he/she/it was in control over it and hence is its exclusive source. 
 How difficult is it for moral agents to meet these two 
conditions, i.e., act in a way that is causally responsible for harm 
and do so intentionally? In cases where the moral agents in 
question are individual human beings, rather than groups, we may 
disagree with each other about what criteria to use in discerning 
causal responsibility and intentionality. But we do not find either 
condition very difficult to meet. Nor should we. For, human beings 
can act in ways that are causally responsible for harm. Likewise, 
they can, if they have achieved a certain level of self-
consciousness, have intentions.  
Things become much more troublesome in cases where the 
moral agents in question are collective entities, though. This is 
because the two things that ostensibly render an agent morally 
responsible for harm in the above sense—performing an action that 
we can consider causally responsible for harm and intending this 
action—require consciousness. While collective entities, whether 
they are corporations, clubs, or nation states, may be capable of 
formulating policies and causing harm, they do not appear to be 
capable of consciousness or, for that matter, of having minds. 
How, then, can they be understood to act or to intend at all? 
Critics of collective moral responsibility answer this question 
in the negative and contend that groups cannot perform actions that 
are causally responsible for harm or have intentions. H. D. Lewis 
and J. W. W. Watkins argued early on that actions are associated 
exclusively with individuals, not groups, and that groups, which do 
not have minds of their own, cannot make choices or hold beliefs 
in the sense required by the formulation of intentions.11  
Contemporary skeptics, including Alvin Goldman, Stephen 
Sverdlick, J. Angelo Corlett, and Jan Narveson, are generally less 
strident than their predecessors. But, they too, have insisted that 
collective moral responsibility falls short once we acknowledge the 
                                                          
11 See generally H. D. Lewis, Collective Responsibility, 23 PHIL. 3 (1948); 
J.W.W. Watkins, Methodological Individualism and Social Tendencies, 8 BRIT. 
J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 104 (1957). 
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simple fact that collective entities cannot have genuine mental 
lives.12 
While skeptics have concentrated primarily on the inability of 
groups to act and to have intentions, they have also on occasion 
focused on the notion of moral blameworthiness and drawn 
attention to what they refer to as the inappropriateness of 
associating moral blameworthiness with groups. R. S. Downie’s 
concerns here are typical. R.S. Downie argues that while we might 
be able to sustain notions of group agency, we cannot sustain 
notions of collective moral responsibility, since the latter requires 
that the agent in question be morally blameworthy.13 Jan Narveson 
goes as far in this context to argue that the bearers of moral 
blameworthiness have to be individuals because only individuals 
can have moral agency. “Nothing else can literally be the bearer of 
full responsibility.”14   
How do advocates of collective moral responsibility respond 
here? Interestingly enough, they do not reject the claim that groups 
have to be able to act and to intend in order to be morally 
responsible for harm. Instead, they accept this claim and set out to 
show that, contrary to critics, groups are capable of acting and 
intending. Unfortunately, as I suggest below, none of their efforts 
to show that groups can act and have intentions have been wholly 
successful. Indeed, they all appear to have serious drawbacks of 
the kind that should make the rest of us pause before we try to talk 
about group intentions and group actions ourselves. 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., Angelo Corlett, Collective Moral Responsibility, 32 J. SOC. 
PHIL. 573 (2001); ALVIN GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION (Prentice 
Hall 1970); Jan Narveson, Collective Responsibility, 6 J. ETHICS 179 (2002); 
Stephen Sverdlik, Collective Responsibility, 51 PHIL. STUD. 61 (1987). 
13 See generally R. S. Downie, Collective Responsibility, 44 PHIL. 66 
(1969). Larry May and Stacey Hoffman capture Downie’s central claims here 
very nicely when they write: According to Downie, “Collectives do not have 
moral faults, since they don’t make choices, and hence they cannot properly be 
ascribed moral responsibility . . . . For there to be moral responsibility there 
must be blameworthiness involving a morally faulty decision, and this can only 
take place on the individual level.” Larry May & Stacey Hoffman, Introduction, 
in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL 
AND APPLIED ETHICS 1–14 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds. 1991). 
14 See generally Jan Narveson, Collective Responsibility, 6 J. ETHICS 179 
(2002). 
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One of the most common strategies employed here is simply to 
point out that we do in fact blame collectives in practice in ways 
that appear to make sense to us. David Cooper relies on this 
strategy heavily in his own defense of collective responsibility. 
According to Cooper, there is an obvious point to be recognized 
and that “obvious point is that responsibility is ascribed to 
collectives, as well as to individual persons. Blaming attitudes are 
held towards collectives as well as towards individuals.”15 
Deborah Tollefsen picks up on the importance of blaming 
attitudes here in her own defense of collective moral responsibility 
as a way of grounding the existence of both group actions and 
group intentions.16 According to Tollefsen, the sheer fact that we 
have emotional responses to groups such as anger, resentment, and 
moral indignation means that collective moral responsibility is 
both possible and meaningful.17 Likewise, the sheer fact that we 
have feelings of pride, guilt, and shame as group members, tells us 
that the group moral agency required by collective moral 
responsibility exists.18 
Cooper and Tollefsen may have accurately described both the 
blaming attitudes and the emotional reactions that we have to 
groups that do bad things in practice. But their analyses share two 
basic limitations. First of all, the sheer fact that we have attitudes 
and reactions that signal our belief in collective moral agency or 
that require us to have such a belief does not mean that collective 
moral agency actually exists. Nor does it mean that we are justified 
in having the attitudes and reactions to groups that we do. (We 
could simply be wrong and/or be falling back on very useful 
myths.) Instead, it means only that we—or at least some of us—
have these attitudes and reactions and that we do not as a 
community find them strange. 
Second, while we may think that that we are blaming a group, 
and refer to ourselves as doing so, we may not in fact be blaming 
the group as a collective. Instead, we may be doing one of two 
                                                          
15 David Cooper, Collective Responsibility, 43 PHIL. 258, 258 (1968). 
16 See generally Deborah Tollefsen, The Rationality of Collective Guilt, 30 
MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 222 (2006). 
17 Id. at 224–226. 
18 Id. at 226–228. 
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other things: namely, blaming individual members of the group 
who are from our perspective representative of it or blaming all 
members of the group by virtue of their group membership. Both 
possibilities are suggested by Tollefsen’s references to shame and 
pride—practices that appear to require moral consciences—as well 
as by the fact that when we blame groups we almost always blame 
individual members of them. 
Cooper himself recognizes the possibility that collective blame 
may turn out to be shared individual responsibility, rather than a 
kind of responsibility that is attached to collectives themselves, and 
sets out to dispute such a possibility.19 He does so by analyzing 
statements that we make about collective blame.20 Cooper argues 
that when we look at statements about collective blame, we see 
that we cannot deduce anything from them about individuals 
themselves.21 He claims “[t]his is so because the existence of 
collectives is compatible with varying membership. No 
determinate set of individuals is necessary for the existence of the 
collective.”22 
Peter French takes a similar approach in his own defense of 
collective responsibility arguing that there is a class of predicates 
that can only be true of collectives. There is, of course, a class of 
predicates that just cannot be true of individuals, that can only be 
true of collectives. Examples are abundant, and surely include 
“disbanded” (most uses of), “lost the football game,” “elected a 
president,” and “passed an amendment.” Methodological 
individualism would be at a loss in responsibility contexts, if 
accountability ascriptions were of this sort.23 
French is undoubtedly correct with regard to the particular kind 
of predicate that he has in mind. The predicate “being to blame,” 
however, is of a different kind. For, it does not, like “disbanding,” 
“losing a football game,” “electing a president,” and “passing an 
amendment,” necessarily involve the efforts of a group. Nor does it 
                                                          
19 Cooper, supra note 15, at 259. 
20 Id. at 260. 
21 Id. at 261. 
22 Id. at 260. 
23 Peter A. French, Types of Collectives, in INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY 37 (Peter A. French, ed. 1998).  
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require us to refer to a group in order to make sense of what is 
being done. Indeed, it may not even be the kind of thing that we 
can associate with groups, if groups, as distinct from their 
members, turn out not to have a moral conscience.24 
All of this suggests that if we are ever going to justify the 
possibility of collective moral responsibility and the notion of 
moral blameworthiness associated with it, we cannot simply point 
out that we blame groups in practice or show that there are kinds of 
things (good and bad) that only groups can do, since our blaming 
practices might be mistaken and doing something does not get us 
to the point of moral responsibility. Instead, we have to show that 
groups can be moral agents of harm in the sense required by moral 
responsibility as understood above. In other words, we have to 
show that groups can have intentions and a moral conscience qua 
groups. 
Not surprisingly, both tasks are very difficult. In the case of 
group intentions, we have to show that groups can have minds, 
since intentions are by nature mental states. Moreover, we have to 
do so even if we lower our standards and talk about intentions that 
are shared among group members, rather than about group 
intentions per se. For, intentions, as mental states, can be shared 
only by positing a shared mind and a shared mind looks awfully 
much like a group mind. In Brook Sadler’s words, “[if] intentions 
are mental states, states which play a fundamental role in an 
agent’s practical deliberations and volition, the prospect of a 
shared intention introduces the specter of shared mental states and 
hence shared minds.”25   
How, then, can defenders of collective moral responsibility 
render the notion of group or even shared intentions 
comprehensible? Interestingly enough, defenders of collective 
responsibility frequently turn back to the works of Durkheim and 
Simmel, as well as to that of Sartre, to ground such intentions, 
                                                          
24 The requirement of moral conscience coincides with that of free will and 
moral agency cited above. To wit: In order for individuals to be morally 
blameworthy, they must have freely willed their bad actions, and in order to 
freely will these actions as bad actions, they must have a moral conscience, i.e., 
be conscious of the rightness and wrongness of their actions. 
25 See generally Brook Jenkins Sadler, Shared Intentions and Shared 
Responsibility, 30 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 115 (2006). 
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although they do so as analytic philosophers rather than as social 
theorists.26 Margaret Gilbert, who grounds her defense of 
collective responsibility in Durkheim’s theory of social facts, 
develops what she calls a “plural subject” account of shared 
intentions to justify group intentions.27 She does so in large part, 
like Michael Bratman and others do, by zeroing in on joint 
commitments.28  According to Gilbert, group intentions exist when 
two or more persons constitute the plural subject of an intention to 
carry out a particular action, or, in other words, when “they are 
jointly committed to intending as a body to do A.”29 
All of this makes sense both linguistically and logically, but we 
still have to know what it means to say that two or more persons 
constitute a plural subject. How, we have to ask, do they constitute 
such a subject? What is the nature of the “plural subject” that gets 
constituted in this context? (How might we describe it?) David 
Velleman takes us part of the way by arguing that “[a] truly plural 
subject . . . involve[s] two or more subjects who combine in such a 
way as to make one subject . . . .”30 But we still need to know how 
they combine to make one subject here and what that subject is. Do 
their minds meld? Or do their minds overlap? Do they share 
minds? Or do they, as Gilbert suggests, simply share 
                                                          
26 See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (W. 
D. Halls trans., 1982); GEORG SIMMEL, ON INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL FORMS 
(D.N. Levine trans., 1971); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICAL 
REASON (Alan Sheridan-Smith trans., 1976).  
27 Gilbert’s work on plural subjects has developed in very interesting ways 
over the years. See, e.g., Margaret Gilbert, Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings, 1 
J. ETHICS 65 (1997); MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS (1989); 
MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL 
SUBJECT THEORY (2000); Margaret Gilbert, Who’s to Blame?, 30 MIDWEST 
STUD. IN PHIL. 94 (2006). 
28 Others do not necessarily use the term “joint commitments.” See, e.g., 
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION 
AND AGENCY 93160 (1999); Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 
101 PHIL. REV. 327 (1992); Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 
97 (1993). See also infra notes 3036.  
29 GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 27, at 22 (using 
the term “shared intentions” rather than “group intentions”). 
30 David Velleman, How to Share an Intention, 57 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 29, 30 (1997). 
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commitments?   
What, moreover, are the plural subjects that result from such 
shared commitments? Neither Gilbert nor Velleman answers this 
question, other than to repeat that the subjects in question come 
together to make one subject. But we can be sure that if these 
plural subjects are going to be considered morally blameworthy by 
virtue of having done something bad together, they have to be 
moral agents. Likewise, we can be sure that if they are going to be 
moral agents they will have to have one mind, rather than 
remaining a plurality of minds, and that that one mind will have to 
be capable of being the source of moral actions, i.e., the kind of 
mind that can formulate intentions. 
Gilbert’s emphasis on shared commitments does not appear to 
provide us with the kind of unitary mind that we need to sustain 
collective moral responsibility. Indeed, as long as the commitments 
that Gilbert has in mind are shared, rather than associated with a 
single being, her plural subjects remain a plurality of minds rather 
than one mind. While positing a plurality of minds may be a good 
way to ground shared individual responsibility, it does not allow us 
to talk about the moral responsibility of collectives per se. How, if 
at all, might we get around this problem? 
Raimo Tuomela comes close to doing so in his own work on 
collective responsibility by articulating what he calls “we-
intentions.”31 Tuomela, like Gilbert, constructs the collective 
subject on the basis of joint commitments and then applies it to the 
notion of collective responsibility.32 However, he does not, like 
Gilbert, stress plurality in his construction of the collective subject. 
Instead, Tuomela stresses unity and argues for it by claiming that 
collective intentional agency supervenes on individual moral 
agency in ways that allow us to do two things that Gilbert and 
others are not quite able to do: namely, posit genuine collective 
                                                          
31 See, e.g., Raimo Tuomela, Actions By Collectives, 3 PHIL. PERSP. 471 
(1989); Raimo Tuomela, Joint Intention, We-Mode, and I-Mode, 30 MIDWEST 
STUD. IN PHIL. 35 (2006); Raimo Tuomela, We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group 
Intentions, 51 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 249 (1991); Raimo Tuomela, 
We-Intentions Revisited, 125 PHIL. STUD. 327 (2005). 
32 See Tuomela, We-Intentions Revisited, supra note 31, at 332–40 
(discussing joint commitments).  
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selves and associate them with minds.33   
Not surprisingly, Tuomela’s success here depends on his 
ability to describe the process of supervention in a way that leads 
us to accept the possibility of a genuine collective moral agent. 
What does he mean by supervention in this context? How does 
supervention work here? According to Tuomela, actions by 
collectives supervene on the actions of the operative members of 
the collective in such a way that the properties of particular 
collectives, such as their intentions, beliefs, and desires, are 
“embodied in” and “determined by” the perspectives of individual 
members.34  
Tuomela is of course obliged to tell us what it means for a 
collective’s intentions, beliefs, and desires to be “embodied in” and 
“determined by” the perspectives of individual members here. In 
doing so, he must make three things in particular clear. The first is 
how collectives can have intentions, beliefs, and desires at the 
outset, i.e., before the collective supervenes on the operative 
members of the collective. The second is the identity of the 
collective subject behind these intentions, beliefs, and desires. The 
third is the ability of this subject to be a moral agent that is capable 
of being morally blameworthy as a collective entity. 
In sum, Tuomela has to be able to conceive of a mind that is 
not only attached to a collective but that exists before it supervenes 
onto individual minds, since otherwise the mind that he calls 
collective is no more than a plurality of individual minds and 
hence not sufficient to sustain his claims about “we-intentions.”35 
Likewise, he has to make sure that this kind of mind can will 
actions on the basis of something like moral choice making, since 
otherwise, the “we-intentions” in question will not be the kinds of 
“we-intentions” that render an agent morally blameworthy. Can he 
do these things?  
Suffice it to say that Tuomela’s claim that collective intentions 
are partly “determined” by the perspectives of the operative 
                                                          
33 See, e.g., Tuomela, Actions By Collectives, supra note 31, at 491–94. 
34 Id. at 494.  
35 See, e.g., Tuomela, We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group Intentions, 
supra note 31; Tuomela, We-Intentions Revisited, supra note 31 (using the term 
“we-intentions” to talk about the moral agency of a unified subject). 
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members of these collectives does not, as he assumes, allow him to 
talk about collective moral agency.36 For, the fact that individual 
group members determine a group’s beliefs, intentions, and desires 
does not mean that the collective takes on their moral agency in the 
process. Nor is moral agency transferable in any case. For, it is not 
a thing—the product of willing—or something that we can detach 
from moral agents. Instead, it is the act of willing itself and hence 
tied exclusively to moral agents and their own mental states. 
Moreover, if a collective’s beliefs, intentions, and desires have 
to be “determined” by group members, how can the collective 
“supervene” on these same group members as a moral agent? 
Tuomela is faced with a dilemma here. On the one hand, he needs 
the moral agency of group members to make sense of a collective 
moral subject. On the other hand, he cannot acknowledge the 
collective’s dependence on group members—and “determination” 
is surely a kind of dependence—without sacrificing that which 
appeared originally to constitute evidence of the collective’s moral 
agency, namely, the collective’s ability to “supervene” on others. 
Since the problem here is that collectives do not appear to have 
minds and hence do not appear to be capable of formulating 
intentions, we might want to shift our attention from the act of 
intending in this context to something that sounds like intending 
but that does not require us to talk about the ability of groups to 
freely will actions. I refer here to the intent that we sometimes 
locate in a group’s policies or laws. Why bring up intent in this 
context? What does it do for us? How, if at all, might we sustain 
judgments of collective moral responsibility in cases where to talk 
about intent makes sense? 
Two things speak to the value of taking intent seriously here. 
First of all, the intent of a law or a policy can both have its source 
in the minds, as well as beliefs, intentions, and desires, of 
individuals and be associated with a group project. Moreover, it 
can do so consistently, since that which is collective here is not a 
moral act. Instead, it is a thing that it can be abstracted from the 
moral agents who created it. Hence, we do not have to associate it 
with a collective mind. Nor do we have to be concerned when we 
make reference to the individuals who originally articulated it. 
                                                          
36 Tuomela, Actions By Collectives, supra note 31, at 494. 
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Indeed, we can make reference to these individuals openly and 
consistently.  
Is such a shift of focus appropriate here? As Lawrence Solan’s 
work on statutory interpretation demonstrates very nicely, a focus 
on intent, rather than intentionality, is totally appropriate in 
contexts such as those associated with statutory interpretation.37 
For, in these contexts, we are not concerned about the process by 
which, say, a group of legislators, formulated a law or policy. 
Instead, we are concerned with what they had in mind when they 
put the law or policy forward, or, in other words, with the product 
of many minds, which is a thing, albeit an intellectual thing, rather 
than an act of will.  Hence, we do not have to locate a single mind 
or a single moral conscience. 
But things change when we move on to questions of moral 
responsibility. For, in the context of moral responsibility, unlike 
that of statutory interpretation, we cannot be satisfied with 
knowing what a group meant when they passed a particular law or 
formulated a particular policy. Instead, we have to know whether 
they willed a particular action and are morally blameworthy. 
Likewise, in the context of moral responsibility, unlike that of 
statutory interpretation, we cannot be satisfied with locating intent. 
Instead, we have to locate intentionality, which, I have suggested 
above, is a very hard, if not impossible, thing to do. 
How, then, are we to proceed? Since we may never be able 
make sense of group intentions or locate them in practice, we 
might want simply to give up talking about collective moral 
responsibility altogether. However, as I elaborate more fully in the 
next section, to do so is not necessary and would in any case be 
premature. For, the standards of moral agency that we now 
associate with moral responsibility, including free will and 
intentionality, may not be the standards of moral responsibility per 
se. Instead, they may be the standards of one particular notion of 
moral responsibility that we do not necessarily have to accept.  
                                                          
37 See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The 
Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 
(2005).  
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II. ARE GROUP INTENTIONS REALLY NECESSARY?  
Why do we need to talk about group intentions in the first 
place? Why do these intentions have to serve the function of free 
will in discussions of moral responsibility and why do we have to 
talk about free will in the context of moral responsibility anyway? 
The answer to these questions lies not, as we often assume, with 
the nature of moral responsibility per se. Instead, it lies with the 
nature of the particular, Kantian, notion of moral responsibility that 
has come to prevail in philosophical circles in recent decades.   
Joel Feinberg captures this notion very nicely when he writes:  
[A] stubborn feeling persists even after legal responsibility 
has been decided that there is still a problem – albeit not a 
legal problem – left over: namely, is the defendant really 
responsible (as opposed to “responsible in law”) for the 
harm?  This conception of a “real” theoretical responsibility 
as distinct from a practical responsibility relative to the 
purposes and values of a particular legal system is 
expressed very commonly in the terminology of “morality” 
– moral obligation, moral guilt, moral responsibility . . .38 
Unlike either social blameworthiness or legal accountability, 
moral responsibility is, according to Feinberg, a purely factual 
matter and as such not susceptible to discretionary judgment. “Like 
all matters of ‘record’, moral responsibility must be read off the 
facts or deduced from them; there can be no irreducible element of 
discretion for the judge.”39 Likewise, moral responsibility must be 
construed as independent not only of any purposes, policies, or 
goals that we may embrace, but of our own opinions about whether 
or not a particular individual is blameworthy. For, unlike its 
worldly counterparts, moral responsibility is:  
liability to charges and credits on some ideal record, 
liability to credit or blame (in the sense of “blame” that 
implies no action). Just as it is, as we say, “forever to the 
credit” of a hero or a saint that he performed some noble 
                                                          
38 JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 30 (1970). 
39 Id. at 31. 
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act, so a man can be “forever to blame” for his faults.40 
Feinberg and others do not explore the nature of “ideal 
liability” in any depth. But they do make clear that it has its source 
in individual moral agents themselves. According to Feinberg, 
individuals are morally blameworthy, not in virtue of our social 
and legal practices of blame, but in virtue of their having 
themselves caused (freely willed) either their own actions or an 
external state of affairs. Likewise, moral blameworthiness is an 
aspect of moral agency itself: “an absolute responsibility within the 
power of the agent.”41 
Michael Zimmerman, in his own efforts to show how moral 
blameworthiness—and hence moral responsibility—can be 
independent of worldly practices of blame, focuses on what he 
takes to be the inwardness and ideal nature of both. According to 
Zimmerman: 
Moral responsibility has to do with the type of inward 
moral praising and blaming that constitutes making a 
private judgment about a person. . . . It is “credit” on his 
“ledger of life”, a “positive mark” on his “report card”, or a 
“blemish” or “stain” on his “record”; that his record has 
been “tarnished”; that his “moral standing” has been 
diminished . . . . Someone who is blameworthy is deserving 
of such blame; that is, if it is correct, or true to the facts, to 
judge that there is a “debit” on his “ledger.”42   
Not surprisingly, it is difficult for secular philosophers to make 
sense of moral blameworthiness here, since they cannot invoke 
either an external blamer (God or the community) or particular 
practices of blame. Hence, they do not generally try to make sense 
of the “ledger of life,” “moral stains,” and moral “report cards” 
that they invoke. Instead, they either place quotation marks around 
these terms—signaling the possibility that they are mere metaphors 
for something deeper and more easily justified—or else they refer 
off-handedly to an omniscient “World Moral Authority” that 
presumably has access to ideal standards of moral 
                                                          
40 Id. at 30. 
41 Id. 
42 MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN, AN ESSAY ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 38 
(1988).  
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blameworthiness.43  
I argue elsewhere that the notion of moral responsibility that 
emerges here is essentially the internalization of what was once 
expressed openly as the Christian notion of moral blameworthiness 
and that it falls apart once we realize two things. The first is that 
terms such as “moral stains” on one “ledger of life,” moral “report 
cards,” and a “World Moral Authority” cannot be sustained in a 
secular context. The second is that without them moral 
blameworthiness cannot be viewed as an aspect of moral agency 
itself or independent of worldly practices of blame.44   
Suffice it here to make three points about this notion of moral 
responsibility that relate to our ability to re-think moral 
responsibility in a collective context. First of all, this notion of 
moral responsibility is not moral responsibility per se. Instead, it is 
a distinctly Kantian notion of moral responsibility that, unlike, say, 
its Aristotelian, Christian, and utilitarian, counterparts, locates 
moral blameworthiness in the wills of moral agents rather than in 
social and legal practice, insists that moral blameworthiness be 
independent of any goals or purposes that we may have as a 
community, and construes moral blameworthiness as a matter of 
moral guilt or moral taint. 
Second, it is only because we accept this distinctly Kantian 
notion of moral responsibility that we insist, not only that an 
agent’s actions have been causally responsible for harm, but that 
the agent has freely willed or at least intended these actions and 
that there be something about the act of freely willing or intending 
itself that renders agents morally blameworthy. In other words, it is 
only because we accept this notion of moral responsibility that we 
find it necessary to impose the conditions of moral responsibility 
that we now do on both individuals and collectives. 
Third, there are other ways of thinking about moral 
responsibility. Aristotelians construe the notion of 
                                                          
43 John Harris, for example, falls back on the language of a “World Moral 
Authority” in his efforts to render moral blameworthiness both ideal and 
independent of what he considers to be our unacceptably low moral standards in 
the community. According to Harris, “[s]urely the World Moral Authority’s 
causal explanation [of harm] is not upset by the discovery that this society 
neglects its . . . members.” Harris, supra note 2, at 206. 
44 SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 72–104. 
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blameworthiness associated with moral responsibility as part of our 
communal practices of blame rather than as an aspect of moral 
agency per se.45 Thus, while they, too, insist that an individual 
must have been causally responsible for harm in order to be 
morally responsible for it, they do not require that the individual 
must have freely willed the harm. Instead, they require only that 
the agent be able to meet communal standards of blame, e.g., that 
the agent not have been coerced or compelled into acting badly.46 
The Christian notion of moral responsibility, like its Kantian 
counterpart, takes blameworthiness out of the community and does 
something that the Aristotelian notion of moral responsibility does 
not: namely, distinguish between moral and social 
blameworthiness. But, unlike its Kantian counterpart, it does not 
abstract moral blameworthiness from all practices of blame. Nor 
does it view an agent as morally blameworthy outside of a 
relationship between the agent and an external blamer. Instead, it 
views individuals as morally blameworthy within a relationship 
between agents and such a blamer—God—who presumably has 
access to ideal standards of blameworthiness.47 
                                                          
45 Aristotle developed his theory of moral responsibility in ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, ch. 1 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill 
1962) (c. 384 B.C.E.). For excellent commentaries on the Aristotelian notion of 
moral responsibility, see generally A. W. H. ADKINS, MERIT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDY IN GREEK VALUES (Clarendon Press 1960); MARTHA 
C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK 
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 282–89 (1986); Jean Roberts, Aristotle on 
Responsibility for Action and Character, 9 ANCIENT PHIL. 23 (1989). I analyze 
the Aristotelian concept of moral responsibility in SMILEY, MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 733–57. 
46 See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 45, at 52–57.    
47 The Christian concept of moral responsibility was originally put forward 
by St. Augustine and St. Aquinas. See AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE 
WILL (Anna S. Benjamin & L. H. Hackstaff trans., Prentice Hall 1964); 
Augustine, On Two Souls Against the Manichees, in THE WORKS OF ST. 
AUGUSTINE (John E. Rotelle, trans., New City Press 1990); Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, Pt. 1, Q. B., in 1 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS 
AQUINAS (A. G. Pegis ed., Random House 1945). For excellent commentaries 
on the Christian concept of moral responsibility, see generally William S. 
Babcock, Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency, 16 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 28 
(1988); F. R. TENNANT, THE CONCEPT OF SIN (Cambridge Univ. Press 1912). I 
analyze the Christian concept of moral responsibility in SMILEY, MORAL 
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Utilitarians are in general reluctant to put forward their own, 
purely utilitarian, notion of moral responsibility, since thinking 
about blame in terms of utility always brings with it the possibility 
of draining blame of its power to influence behavior, i.e., its utility. 
But they do, in criticizing the Kantian notion of moral 
responsibility, make clear that blameworthiness cannot be justified 
in a secular context on anything other than utilitarian grounds. 
Likewise, they do, in sketching the contours of a utilitarian notion 
of moral responsibility, couple causal responsibility with social 
blameworthiness and justify such blameworthiness with reference 
to its instrumental value.48   
All of these notions of moral responsibility have conditions of 
their own that collective entities might not be able to meet. Indeed, 
since they were all designed to grasp the moral agency of 
individuals, rather than that of collective entities, they might not be 
any more appropriate to discussions of collective moral 
responsibility than their Kantian counterpart. But they do suggest, 
at the very least, that we do not have to accept the prevailing 
Kantian notion of moral responsibility or its particular conditions 
in discussions of moral responsibility and that, if necessary, we can 
think about developing an alternative notion moral responsibility 
that is appropriate to collective, rather than individual, moral 
agents, and that has its own conditions.  
III. RE-THINKING COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
What might such an alternative notion of collective moral 
responsibility look like? I suggest one possibility below. However, 
                                                          
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 58–71. 
48 The two most frequently cited utilitarian treatments of moral 
responsibility are: Richard B. Brandt, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, 78 PHIL. 
REV. 337 (1969) and J. J. C. Smart, Free-Will, Praise and Blame, 70 MIND 291 
(1961). Brandt argues that guilt feelings and a sense of blameworthiness: 
increase motivation in a desired direction—that is, improve the 
corresponding kind of character, and suggests that once a sense of 
moral blameworthiness comes to be associated with the more general 
idea of a particular action, the unpleasant associations provide a 
“boost” in the “right direction” for similar situations in the future.  
Brandt, supra, at 357. 
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since re-thinking moral responsibility in general takes a great deal 
of effort, we might want to ask first: Is it worth the effort? Do we 
really want to talk about collective moral responsibility anyway? 
Do we really need to do so? Two concerns arise here. The first is 
the possibility that collective moral responsibility threatens 
normative values that we take seriously and hence is not worth 
pursuing. The second is that even if collective moral responsibility 
is not such a threat, it is unnecessary, since we can accomplish the 
same goals in this context by expanding individual moral 
responsibility. 
The normative value that critics worry about most here is 
individual moral responsibility, although concerns about fair 
blaming also surface. How, critics ask, can we place collective 
moral responsibility at the center of our attention without 
undermining the value of individual moral responsibility? How, 
moreover, can we ascribe moral responsibility to groups without 
rendering individual moral responsibility—and blameworthiness—
insignificant if not meaningless? How, in any case, can we hold 
groups collectively responsibility without unfairly blaming some 
of its members? 
The assumption here is that collective moral responsibility 
either undermines individual moral responsibility or shoves it 
aside. Garret Hardin argued early on that collective responsibility 
undermines individual initiative and creates havoc for those 
practices that require individuals to take responsibility for their 
own actions, e.g., the maintenance of their own families and 
property.49 Contemporary liberals tend to be less vehement than 
Hardin was in this context. But, they, too, worry that once 
collective responsibility is legitimated, individuals will lose their 
sense of individual moral agency, as well as manage to avoid 
blame in cases where they should be blamed.50 
                                                          
49 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 
1243 (1968). 
50 Joel Feinberg goes as far as to argue that the threat to individual agency 
posed by collective responsibility renders collective responsibility outdated and 
obsolete. Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 679–81 
(1968). Jan Narveson couples his concern for individual agency with a concern 
for fair blaming in Jan Narveson, Collective Responsibility, 6 J. ETHICS 179, 
186–87 (2002).  
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Moreover, the potential loss of individual moral responsibility 
here is not a purely personal matter. According to Richard 
McKeon, if collective responsibility were to replace personal 
responsibility in society, we would no longer be able to sustain 
liberal and democratic government, since both liberalism and 
democracy require self-government and self-government is only 
possible when individuals take responsibility for their actions. 
Indeed, McKeon argues, if we were to “revert” to collective 
responsibility—McKeon’s argument here is historical—we would 
once again find ourselves confronted with the need for a great deal 
of state power.51 
What about moral responsibility and blameworthiness 
themselves? Mark Reiff argues that while collective moral 
responsibility can be very helpful in both preventing bad behavior 
by groups in the future and bringing about social control more 
generally, it can also lead to violence—cycles of retaliation—and 
the undermining of morality itself by severing the ties between 
responsibility and blame. How is the latter possible? According to 
Reiff: “The problem here is not that people are less likely to feel 
responsible for their own misconduct if they feel that others will be 
held collectively responsible [for harm, but that collective 
responsibility] encourages people to feel responsible and subject to 
punishment even when they have personally behaved 
correctly . . .” and hence, punishment is no longer an incentive.52 
In the end, collective responsibility “undermines the very concept 
of responsibility itself,” as well as “morality in general,” by 
severing the ties between responsibility and a meaningful notion of 
blameworthiness and deserved punishment.53 
While all of these concerns are important, they appear to 
challenge collective moral responsibility only if we are unable to 
sustain individual moral responsibility once we legitimate 
collective moral responsibility. In other words, they assume that 
we cannot have both individual and collective responsibility in the 
                                                          
51 See generally Richard McKeon, The Development and Significance of 
the Concept of Responsibility, 2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 3 
(1957) (Belg.).  
52 Mark R. Reiff, Terrorism, Retribution, and Collective Responsibility, 34 
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 209, 242 (2008). 
53 Id. 
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same community or balance them in a morally acceptable fashion. 
But such an assumption may not be warranted and in any case is in 
need of empirical verification. Hence, while we may never be able 
to balance individual and collective moral responsibility in the way 
that we think that they should be balanced, we cannot simply take 
it for granted that the two are mutually exclusive. 
Why, though, is collective moral responsibility necessary? 
Admittedly, there are now cases in which shared individual moral 
responsibility would work just fine, e.g., cases in which we can 
both locate the particular individuals in a group who caused harm 
and conclude honestly that they did so regardless of the group’s 
identity or structure. But there are other cases in which we simply 
cannot locate the source of harm solely in particular individuals’ 
actions, shared or otherwise. In these cases, the collective itself 
appears to have produced the harm as well—albeit through its 
shaping and organization of individual intentions and actions. Here 
a purely individualistic model of moral responsibility would not 
seem to be the answer. 
The classical example here is that of a mob that forms among 
individuals whose own intentions may simply be to escape a 
natural or man-made disaster but who inadvertently cause harm 
together as a mob. In the case of such a mob, there is neither an 
organizational structure in place nor a group purpose that we can 
locate. Nor are there individuals who can be understood to have 
planned the harm or, for that matter, to have acted in a 
blameworthy fashion. Hence, we cannot invoke individual moral 
responsibility. Instead, we have to acknowledge that it was the 
mob itself—which exists above and beyond those participating in 
it—that caused the harm. 
Mobs provide us with a very straightforward case of collectives 
that produce harm by virtue of their nature as particular kinds of 
collectives. But mobs are not the only kinds of collectives that 
appear to cause harm over and above their individual members. 
Indeed, even in cases where we can locate a great deal of bad 
behavior on the part of individual moral agents and ascribe moral 
responsibility to them for harm, we can still sometimes say that the 
collective in question has done something wrong that individuals 
themselves could not do and that renders the collective itself 
responsible qua collective.  
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Three such cases come to mind. The first is that of companies 
such as Enron whose ethos and structure were causally responsible 
for harm in a way that goes beyond the causal responsibility of 
particular members by virtue of the collective nature of these 
causal factors. Kenneth Shockley, among others, argues that Enron 
as a collective entity played an “eliminable” role in the harm that 
its executives brought about by virtue of its company norms, 
incentive structures, and practices of discipline. “The norms 
operative within the membership of Enron controlled for the 
climate of secrecy and doubt.”54   
The second case is that of nation states whose military systems 
appear to be at least partly responsible for the killing of innocents. 
In this case, we may be able locate the particular individuals who 
do the killing and, since militaries are organized, we will probably 
always be able to go up the chain of command to locate those who 
have made various kinds of decisions. (How far up we go is always 
a question). But we will also have to confront the fact that there is 
something about the structure of the collective that will make the 
killing of innocents likely, even if those participating in the war 
find the killing of innocents atrocious. 
The third case is that of all-male or all-white business clubs 
whose very nature promotes the disempowerment of women and 
blacks, as well as discrimination against them more generally in 
the business world. In this case, we may be able to say that many 
of the clubs’ members are morally responsible for the harms in 
question. But we have to admit that there is something about the 
clubs themselves, including the very bonds that they create among 
members and the ideology associated with them, as well as their 
admissions policies, which enables club members to do the harm 
that they do. 
In the above scenarios, a model of collective moral 
responsibility would be very helpful. How might we develop such 
a model? How might we think about collective moral 
responsibility in a way that addresses these cases without violating 
individual moral agency or draining blameworthiness of its 
meaning? I assume that there are a variety of ways in which we 
                                                          
54 Kenneth Shockley, Programming Collective Control, 38 J. SOC. PHIL. 
442, 449 (2007). 
196 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
might proceed here. Let me simply gesture to one possible way of 
doing so as a way of opening up discussion about how collective 
moral responsibility might be re-conceptualized in the future. 
Since we need to associate moral blameworthiness with 
agency—otherwise blaming would cease to be either fair or 
effective—we will need to retain some kind of causation in our 
discussions of collective moral responsibility. Likewise, since we 
are talking about collective, rather than individual, moral 
responsibility, we will have to make sure that this kind of causation 
makes sense in the lives of collectives. In other words, we will, 
like Aristotelians, Christian philosophers, and Kantians, have to 
work with the particular kinds of moral agents that we have in 
mind—in our case collectives, as distinct from citizens of the polis, 
Christian souls, or moral idealists—and make sure that we 
articulate a notion of causation that is appropriate to them.   
What kind of causation might this be? How might we associate 
it with blameworthiness in the lives of groups such as corporations, 
clubs, and nations states? Here we might want to replace the 
Kantian notion of moral agency—as well as the association of 
moral responsibility with the act of freely willing a bad action—
with a looser notion of producing or creating harm. In other words, 
we might want to associate agency with producing and creating in 
our efforts to develop a notion of moral responsibility that makes 
sense in the context of groups. 
Not surprisingly, not just any kind of producing or creating 
will do here. Instead, it has to be producing or creating that 
presupposes control by the collective over the harm’s having come 
about—even in cases where individual members performed the bad 
actions that resulted in harm—by virtue of group structure, 
identity, or ideology. In other words, the producing or creating in 
question has to be both necessary to the harm’s having come 
about—individuals could not have produced or created it on their 
own—and a condition under which these individuals were able to 
act badly. 
Since collectives will in most cases produce harm by enabling 
or leading group members to perform harmful actions, collective 
moral responsibility will probably always involve the actions of 
group members. (How could it not in the context of corporations, 
clubs, and nation states, as well as that of mobs?) But this 
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likelihood does not require us to equate collective moral 
responsibility with individual moral responsibility. For, collectives 
can—and should—be understood as doing something that these 
individuals could not do without the collective’s support. 
Two things change by shifting our attention to producing and 
creating in the context of collective moral responsibility. First of 
all, we no longer ask: “Did the corporation, club, or nation state in 
question willingly cause harm?” (“Were its intentions bad? Did it 
act on these intentions?”) Instead, we ask: “Is there something 
about the collective entity itself—such as its structure, identity, 
ethos, laws, ideology, or code of conduct—that is to be blame for 
the harm?”  (“Were group members led to act in the way they did 
because of one or more of these aspects of the collective?”) 
Second, the agent in this context does not have to have freely 
willed harm or intended it in the sense required by individual 
moral responsibility. Instead, two other things have to be true.  
First of all, the group in question must have what Kenneth 
Shockley calls “coordinating control” over group members and be 
capable of ensuring that its members work together in a particular 
way to bring about harm.55 Second, the group must have been 
necessary to the harm’s having come about. In other words, group 
members could not have brought the harm about on their own.  
What kind of collective entities meet these conditions? As 
Shockley himself argues very nicely, in Enron, the climate of 
dishonesty and the perverted incentive system enabled, if not led, 
group members to defraud their shareholders and the public.56 
Hence, we can conclude in this case that while particular 
individuals carried out the fraudulent actions and may well have 
cheated on their own, the harm in question would not have been 
possible without the collective’s accounting practices and secretive 
administrative structures. In other words, we can conclude that the 
corporation was necessary to the harm’s occurrence. 
Nation states have many sub-groups and hence many 
candidates for collective moral responsibility. In the case of a 
military operation gone wrong, we can say that the nation state—or 
at least its particular military system—was causally responsible for 
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harm if, say, the particular command structure in place or the 
nature of its weaponry led soldiers to kill non-combatants out of 
necessity. Likewise, when looking at the nation state’s economic 
system, we can say that it—or at least parts of it, e.g., a lax 
regulatory agency—was responsible for various market abuses if 
the harm could not have occurred without these agencies’ lax 
behavior. 
In such a circumstance, what kind of moral blameworthiness 
can, and should, we associate with the production or creation of 
harm? Two things need to be understood at the outset. First of all, 
the kind of moral blameworthiness that we come up with does not 
have to be an aspect of collective moral agency itself. Nor does it 
have to be independent of social and political practice. Instead, it 
can be a judgment that we ourselves make as a community after 
the group in question has acted and hence be relative to our own 
criteria of blame, as well as to the purposes behind these criteria 
and the practices of blame of which they are a part. 
Second, just as Aristotelians, Christian philosophers, and 
Kantians, if not utilitarians, developed their notion of moral 
blameworthiness with reference to particular notions of moral 
agency, so can we. In other words, we do not have to conform to a 
view of moral blameworthiness that was intended to capture, say, a 
Christian or secularized Christian, sense of moral agents. Nor, for 
that matter, do we have to conform to a view that was developed to 
capture the moral agency of individuals. Instead, we can—and 
should—begin by asking: What kind of moral blameworthiness 
might be appropriate to groups such as corporations, nation states, 
and clubs?   
Since groups do not have minds or moral consciences of their 
own qua groups, we cannot consider them to be morally guilty in 
the internalized sense that we encountered above. Nor, 
presumably, would we want to do so—given that they are 
organizations rather then persons.  (Mobs may fall out of the 
picture here since they are not organized.)57 But we can understand 
                                                          
57 The argument here would have to be, not that mobs cannot produce 
harm—which they can—but that it only makes sense to blame collectives that 
can be understood to be affected by blame, e.g., organizations, and mobs are not 
this kind of collective. 
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collectives as doing bad things in the world by virtue of their 
particular identity or structure and hence deserving of the kinds of 
blame and punishment that we now or should in the future 
associate with groups such as corporations, clubs, and nation 
states. 
What would it mean for such a group to be deserving of 
punishment? What might punishment mean in the context of 
collectives? In cases where the harm in question is very great and 
the group cannot be reformed without denying its core identity or 
reason to be, it might mean that the group deserves to be 
eliminated altogether as a group (which is in no way to say that its 
members should be eliminated as individuals). The Nazi regime 
provides us with such a case. So, too, might some contemporary 
race-based hate groups in the United States and elsewhere. 
In other cases, the kind of blame and punishment that 
constitutes the backdrop to blameworthiness might be associated 
with reparations for wrongdoing. In these cases, we would have to 
say of a group, e.g., a corporation that knowingly wreaked havoc 
on the environment and destroyed the livelihood of citizens, that it 
deserves to be punished financially and forced to pay reparations to 
those who have been harmed. Moreover, if our concern is with 
moral blameworthiness, we would have to say that the group is 
blameworthy, not simply according to law, but according to the 
community’s sense of acceptable and unacceptable moral behavior.  
In the case of corporations, we can also think about punishing a 
particular company that has done moral harm as a matter of 
restricting their autonomy. In some cases, the restriction of 
autonomy might be a matter of forcing the corporation to 
restructure itself or partly disband in the interests of making sure 
that it does not continue to do harm in the future. In other cases, it 
might be a matter of political authorities temporarily taking over 
parts of the company’s operations while such restructuring is 
carried out or while personnel is being shuffled. 
Not surprisingly, the particular form that blame takes here is 
restricted by what we take to be the legitimate reach of the state. In 
cases where the state has no legitimate role, we will not be able to 
say that a collective deserves legal punishment. But we still might 
be able to say, in cases where to do so is warranted by the facts, 
that the collective deserves—in a moral sense—to be condemned 
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by the community and perhaps even boycotted. Moreover, we can 
and probably should do so even in cases where the state can 
intervene, e.g., in cases where clubs violate existing anti-
discriminatory law. 
Since those writing about collective moral responsibility have 
generally assumed that they have to work within the parameters of 
the prevailing, Kantian, notion of moral responsibility, they have 
not as a group explored many of these possibilities.  But there are 
important exceptions. Kenneth Shockley, in his work on collective 
moral responsibility, replaces the Kantian notion of moral 
blameworthiness with a looser notion of “being at fault” that 
allows us to talk about a particular collective as “deserving of 
some kind of punishment apart from that meted out to its members 
for their role in harm.”58 
Neta Crawford also distances herself from the Kantian notion 
of moral blameworthiness in her work on collective moral 
responsibility and talks about groups as doing morally bad 
things—in some cases through the actions of their members—
because of the particular kind of group that they are and how they 
operate.59 Crawford’s particular concern here is with military 
groups whose soldiers end up killing innocent civilians as a result 
of either their particular rules of military engagement or the kinds 
of weapons that they employ. How, if it all, Crawford asks, can we 
talk about both the military and the nation state of which it is a part 
as morally blameworthy in these cases? 
Crawford responds that while it makes no sense to consider a 
military group morally guilty in the sense of having a tainted soul, 
it does make sense to consider it a morally bad organization that 
deserves punishment.60 Crawford, unlike many others, recognizes 
in this context that we have to be careful that the punishment that 
groups deserve—and the notion of moral blameworthiness 
associated with them—are appropriate to the particular kind of 
group they are.61 Hence, she chooses to view punishment, as well 
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as moral blameworthiness, in the cases about which she is 
concerned, as a matter of forcing a collective to apologize, make 
amends, and change.62 
According to Crawford, the “change” here frequently amounts 
to either eradicating parts of the group in question or changing 
those aspects of the group that lead it to produce harm. In the case 
of, say, a terrorist operation that was developed precisely to bring 
about harm, eradication may be appropriate. In the case of a 
military group that is otherwise acceptable, it might mean 
“reduc[ing] the likelihood of systematic atrocities and avoidable 
accidents by reviewing and revising the choice of weapons and 
rules of engagement. And . . . apologiz[ing] and mak[ing] repair 
when systematic atrocity occurs.”63 
How might we incorporate the kinds of blameworthiness that 
Shockley and Crawford articulate here into an alternative notion of 
collective moral responsibility? I have suggested in this essay that, 
before all else, we will have to stop thinking about collective moral 
responsibility as a moral fact about agents—that they freely willed 
harm and are morally blameworthy by virtue of doing so—and 
begin thinking about collective moral responsibility as a matter of 
two judgments that we as a moral community make about a group 
on the basis of our own standards: namely, that the group did 
something morally wrong by producing harm and that the group is 
worthy of a particular kind of (worldly) blame. 
Not surprisingly, the view of collective moral responsibility 
that I have put forward here is bound to appear unsatisfactory to 
Kantians, since the two judgments on which it rests are both 
relative to our own norms, expectations, and projects. But, I have 
suggested above, the fact that we have the power to shape our 
judgments of casual responsibility and moral blameworthiness as a 
community should not be taken as a threat to either individual or 
collective moral responsibility. Instead, it should be taken as the 
basis for developing notions of both that are coherent and 
appropriate to the particular kinds of moral agents with which they 
are associated, as well as useful to us in grounding more worldly 
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practices of social blame and legal punishment. 
 
